AbstractWyner's wiretap channel is generalized to the case when the sender, the receiver and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas. We consider two cases: the deterministic case and the fading case. In the deterministic case, the channel matrices of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are fixed and known to all the nodes. In the fading case, the channel matrices experience block fading and the sender has only the intended receiver's channel state information (CSI) and statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel. For the deterministic case, a scheme based on the generalized-singular-value-decomposition (GSVD) of the channel matrices is proposed and shown to achieve the secrecy capacity in the high signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) limit. When the intended receiver has only one antenna (MISO case) the secrecy-capacity is characterized for any SNR. Next, a suboptimal "artificial noise" based scheme is considered. Its performance is characterized and observed to be nearly optimal in the high SNR regime for the MISO case. This scheme extends naturally to the fading case and results are reported for the MISO case. For the independent Rayleigh fading distribution as we simultaneously increase the number of antennas at the sender and the eavesdropper, the secrecy capacity approaches zero if and only if the ratio of the number of eavesdropper antennas to transmitter antennas is at least two.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel introduced by Wyner [1] has potential applications in secret-key distribution over wireless links. In this paper, we study the Gaussian wiretap channel when the sender, the intended receiver and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas. Note that unlike the scalar case [2] , our channel of interest is a non-degraded broadcast channel. A first natural attempt to characterize the secrecy capacity is to apply a result by Csiszair and Korner [3] who characterized the secrecy capacity for the non-degraded discrete memoryless wiretap channel (with transition probability p(Yr, Ye IX)) Cs = max I(U; Yr)-I(U; Ye), (1) p(U),Xff(U) where U is an auxiliary random variable over a certain alphabet and f (.) is a stochastic mapping from U to X. While the secrecy capacity (1) naturally extends to the continuous alphabet case, the optimal choice of U and f(.) are not clear a priori.
In the present paper, we develop an upper bound on the MIMO wiretap secrecy capacity, that enables us to characterize the secrecy capacity in the high signal-to-noise-ratio ( for the special case when the intended receiver has only one antenna (the MISO case). Perhaps more interestingly, the optimal capacity achieving scheme admits a geometrical interpretation. Suppose Hr C C'X`t and He C C'Xlt denote the channel matrices of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. An optimal strategy is to perform a generalizedsingular-value-decomposition (GSVD) of the pencil (Hr, He) (see e.g., [4] , [5] ) to reduce the system into a set of parallel channels and then use an independent Gaussian wiretap codebook on the resulting channels. In the case of the MISO channel, the optimal scheme (at any SNR) is to beamform along the direction of the generalized eigenvector of the pencil (It + PH/1Hr, It + PH HHe), where P denotes the SNR.
While the capacity achieving schemes require that the transmitter exploit the knowledge of both Hr and He, the knowledge of He may not be available to the transmitter in practice. Motivated by this consideration, we study an 'artificial noise" (AN) based scheme that does not require the knowledge of He. The proposed scheme performs a singular value decomposition of Hr, transmits information along the directions corresponding to non-zero singular values of Hr, and transmits artificial noise in the null space of Hr.
We characterize the achievable rate and the associated loss with respect to the high SNR secrecy capacity. Somewhat surprisingly, the AN scheme is nearly optimal for the MISO case in the high SNR limit. Our analysis provides new insights into the artificial noise based scheme which was studied in [6] via monte-carlo simulations.
The AN scheme extends naturally to the block fading channels when only the intended receiver's channel state information (CSI) is known to the sender and statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel is available. We provide an achievable rate expression for the MISO case. More interestingly, in the i. 
III. UPPER BOUND ON SECRECY CAPACITY
We develop an expression for the upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the MIMO channel (2) which will be used to establish several results in the subsequent sections.
We define two sets: pA{Kp Tr(Kp) < P, Kp > 0} is the set of feasible input covariance matrices and /Co {KD KD [ Proof Outline: We only sketch the main steps of the proof, which will be provided in [7] . First, following Wyner (4) IV. GSVD BASED SCHEME To provide our achievable scheme, it is convenient to introduce the GSVD (generalized singular value decomposition [4] , [5] ) of the pair (Hr, He). Intuitively, this transform decomposes the system into a set of parallel independent channels, which can then be encoded separately. This is analogous to the case of no eavesdropper, where the singular value decomposition (SVD) reduces the system into a set of parallel channels. The GSVD, unlike the SVD, is not (8) where o(l) -> 0 as P -> oc and H1 e Cntxnt is the projection matrix onto Null(He). ' The gsvd(.) command in MATLAB does not enforce a lower triangular structure on Q but instead sets 4Jt = However, it can be easily modified for our definition by performing the LQ decomposition of Q-1 Remark 1: The dimension of the subspace Sd Null(Hr)1 0 Null(He) can be viewed as the number of degrees of freedom of the MIMO wiretap channel. Note that the secrecy capacity can be positive even when there are no available degrees of freedom. This distinction between zero capacity and having no degrees of freedom will also appear in the fading case, when the sender only has the intended receiver's CSI.
Remark 2: The result in Theorem 2 can also be used to establish the necessary and sufficient condition that the secrecy capacity is zero. In particular, for any P > 0, CMJMO ( 
Remark 3: In the absence of an eavesdropper, i.e., when He
On, x nt, our capacity expression reduces to CMJMO(P) = log 1r + PHrHrH + o(l), which is simply the high SNR MIMO capacity.
To establish the main ideas in the proof of Theorem 2 it is instructive to consider the case when He has a full column rank. The proof of the case when He does not have a full column rank is along the same lines, but requires us to exploit the lower triangular structure of Q to explicitly characterize HrHl via the GSVD and is provided in the full version [7] .
Proof 
where the second equality follows from the fact that the maximum over Kp is attained for Kp x (hr-H0)(hr_ H' 0)H.
For Amax(*,) > 1, evaluating (18) for = h=ivHev and 0 Amax(, *>), we have that R+ < log Amax( ) as required.
Remark 4: In the MISO case, beamforming is optimal at any SNR, and regardless of the number of eavesdropping antennas. However the beamforming direction depends on both hr and He. In the high SNR regime the optimal direction approaches zero-forcing i.e., H.'hr (whenever it is nonzero). In the low SNR regime, it approaches an eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of hrh H _ H'He, and not the "matched-filtering" direction of hr. We conclude with some Corollaries to Theorem 3.
Corollary 2: In the high SNR regime, the MISO secrecy capacity is given by: cMSO(P) _flog (P H hr l2)] +0 (1) Note that we can interpret the symbols B1, B2,... ,Bd as information symbols, while the symbols Bd+1, Bn, as "artificial noise".
Remark 5: The proposed scheme (21) has been studied in [6] in the context of MISO fading channels where the term artificial-noise has been coined. Their study is however based on monte-carlo simulations. To our knowledge, the present work is the first one to provide an analytical study of this scheme. By comparing the achievable rate for this scheme and with the secrecy capacity in Theorem 2, we can develop some new insights into these schemes. We first establish an achievable rate for the artificial noise scheme by evaluating (1) for our choices of U and X in (21). where Pt = P/nt.
Note that the expression in (22) captures the intuitive fact that the eavesdropper "projects" the received signal into the subspace of Vr. We next do a high SNR analysis of (22) 
where (71, (2, . s, are the (non-trivial) generalized singular values of the pair (Hr, He) and o(l) -> 0 as P --> oc.
The proof follows from a Taylor series expansion of (22). Note that one can also obtain qualitatively similar results when rank(Hr) = nt. The technical constraint that the matrices be either full row rank or full column rank is satisfied with probability 1 if the entries of Hr and He are sampled from i.i.d. CJV(0, 1) distribution.
Remark 6: The expressions (23) and (24) for the achievable rate for the AN scheme in Theorem 4 can be easily compared with the corresponding expressions for the secrecy capacity in Theorem 2. The suboptimality of the artificial noise scheme is due to the fact that (23) and (24) include singular values which take value in (0, 1) and contribute negatively to the summation.
The AN scheme is nearly optimal for the MISO case. Corollary 4: In the high SNR limit, the loss incurred by the AN scheme for the MISO case (16) In particular, the AN scheme provides a rate of CMSO (P/lnt) in the high SNR regime. Thus the price for not knowing the eavesdropper's channel is a multiplicative increase in the power. In this sense, the artificial noise scheme simulates transmission along the direction of optimal eigenvector by using additional power.
VII. FADING CHANNELS
In this section we extend the model (2) to allow Hr (t) and He (t) to vary with time. We assume that the realization of Hr (t) is known to the sender (and the receiver), while only the statistical characterization of He (t) is available. The eavesdropper has access to both He (t) and Hr (t).
We study achievable rates for the block fading channel model i.e., the channel matrices Hr(t) and He(t) are constant for a duration of T symbols and change independently across coherence periods. In the limit of large coherence periods, the variable rate coding scheme in [8] The achievable rate in (27) depends only on the statistical distribution of hr and He and naturally the secrecy capacity decreases as we increase ne with nt fixed.
Theorem 5: Suppose that hr and He are sampled independently from a Rayleigh fading distribution. Consider the limit that nrr -> oc and nre -> oc with '-= , held fixed. For any Q > 2, the secrecy capacity approaches zero at any SNR.
Conversely, for any /3 < 2 and sufficiently large SNR, the achievable rate for the artificial noise based scheme is positive.
Remark 9: Note that the rate R_(hr,He,P(hr)) in (27) is non-negative. Accordingly, for any finite value of ne the secrecy capacity is non-zero. However for any fixed nt, as nre -> oc, observe that R_ (hr, He, P(hr)) -> 0 almost surely.
Theorem 5 states that if we allow nt to increase simultaneously with nr then the ratio of nt/nr must be at least 1/2 for the secrecy capacity to remain positive as nle°.
Remark 10: The requirement that nt > lie for the MISO secrecy capacity to be positive admits a simple intuitive explanation. In the artificial noise scheme, the sender will beamform to the intended receiver and transmit artificial noise in the remaining nt-1 directions. The eavesdropper will need nt-1 antennas to cancel the artificial noise and an additional nt antennas to do receiver beamforming to enjoy the same signal strength as the intended receiver. Thus a total of 2nt -1 will be required for the eavesdropper to be better than the intended receiver.
